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Abstract
We present a novel explanation for the group polarization effect whereby dis-
cussion induces shifts toward the extreme. In our theory, rhetorically-induced
asymmetry preferentially facilitates majority formation among extreme group
members thereby skewing consensus outcomes further in the extreme direction.
Additionally, heuristic issue substitution can shift the effective reference point
for discussion from the policy reference, yielding differential polarization by pol-
icy side. Two mathematical models implementing the theory are introduced:
a simple rhetorically-proximate majority model and the accept-shift-constrict
model of opinion dynamics on networks which allows for the emergence of en-
during majority positions. These models produce shifts toward the extreme
without the typical modeling assumption of greater resistance to persuasion
among extremists. Our online group discussion experiment manipulated policy
side, disagreement level, and network structure. The results, which challenge
existing polarization theories, are in qualitative and quantitative accord with
our theory and models.
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Experiments on small groups deciding upon options of varying risk levels have
shown that discussion can shift group members toward more risky preferences. This
risky shift effect was the first demonstration of the broader phenomenon of group po-
larization in which discussion among members who share the same initial inclinations
on an issue induces more extreme decisions or opinions. Hundreds of experiments
have shown, for example, that groups also exhibit systematic shifts in the direction
of more caution, greater hostility toward an out-group, more lenient punishments,
and more extreme political attitudes (Myers and Lamm 1976; Isenberg 1986; Brown
1986). Metrically, group polarization occurs if, when all group members have posi-
tions that lie on one side of the issue’s neutral reference point, the post-discussion
mean position shifts even further away from the reference point compared with the
pre-discussion mean.
Although group polarization has earned a place in the canon of social influence
phenomena, fundamental questions remain open including its integration with pro-
cesses that reduce disagreement, the effect of network structure, and reference point
determination. This paper addresses these three areas theoretically, mathematically,
and experimentally. We present a theory in which the distinction between the policy
under debate and the rhetorical issue upon which discussion is centered is crucial. A
concave (downward curving) functional dependence of the rhetorical issue upon policy
induces an asymmetry wherein the rhetorical distance between extreme members is
compressed relative to more moderate ones. This “rhetorically-induced asymmetry”
(RIA) facilitates the emergence of a majority at the extreme, which then drives the
final consensus. Furthermore, the substitution of a heuristic issue in place of the
proper rhetorical issue can shift the operative reference point for discussion, enhanc-
ing polarization on one policy side yet suppressing it on the other. We implement
this theory mathematically using a simple “rhetorically-proximate majority” (RPM)
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model that places the consensus policy midway between the policies of the rhetorically
closest dyad.
We conducted an experiment in which triads engaged in online discussion about
wagering on National Football League (NFL) games where the outcome of concern
was not the winner of the game but whether or not the margin of victory of the
favorite team exceeds the oddsmakers’ point spread. The results showed (1) a signif-
icant risky shift only on one policy side, and significantly greater shifts for (2) high
disagreement over low and (3) complete networks over chains. The first result, in
particular, runs directly counter to existing theories, which expect polarization for
groups with homogeneous inclinations. These results, however, not only accord with
our qualitative theoretical predictions but are also in quantitative agreement with the
RPM model.
We also present a micro-level model, the “accept-shift-constrict” (ASC) model
that describes opinion change processes over a network as group members exchange
messages. These processes consist of, first, the acceptance of a persuasive message
which can then lead to a shift in the receiver’s opinion and, importantly, a constric-
tion of their uncertainty level — this in turn narrows the extent to which subsequent
messages advocating distant opinions are accepted. In combination with RIA, the
ASC model is in qualitative and quantitative agreement with our experimental re-
sults. Even without RIA, ASC represents a new model of opinion network dynamics
in which the persistence of majority positions is enhanced via mutual uncertainty
reduction among those with similar opinions, a dynamic absent from standard con-
tinuous opinion models (DeGroot 1974; Friedkin and Johnsen 2011; Lorenz 2007).
The RIA-ASC combination allows for shifts toward the extreme to arise without re-
liance upon systematic skews in resistance to persuasion as commonly assumed within
the opinion network modeling literature.
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Theory
Background
Two distinct influence processes — informational and normative — are most widely
accepted as causes of group polarization (Myers and Lamm 1976; Isenberg 1986;
Brown 1986). The informational influence explanation, known as persuasive argu-
ments theory, focuses on the role of novel arguments. In essence, group members
who are on the same side of an issue will, in general, possess different arguments
buttressing that side; discussion then exposes group members to new information
supporting their initial inclination thereby shifting it further in the same direction.
For the normative influence explanation, social comparison theory, a culturally salient
norm acts so as to prejudice positions toward one pole. For example, a norm favoring
risk-taking makes riskier positions more socially ideal than cautious ones.
We address three key open questions in group polarization theory that limit its
predictive ability in natural settings. The first, and most important, question in-
volves how polarization mechanisms play out in conjunction with processes for resolv-
ing disagreement. A strong reading of either persuasive arguments theory or social
comparison theory implies that a shift toward the extreme should occur whenever
group members are on the same side of an issue and, respectively, possess distinctive
supporting information or operate under a salient biasing norm. However, group po-
larization theory has never clearly explicated how the informational and normative
mechanisms operate relative to stronger concurrent — and potentially countervailing
— social influence processes, such as pressure toward consensus and majority influ-
ence. The implicit assumption that, in the absence of the polarization preconditions,
a group will typically converge to the mean of its initial opinion distribution has
not been borne out experimentally (Davis 1996; Friedkin 1999; Ohtsubo, Masuchi,
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and Nakanishi 2002). Consequently, when faced with a given group with a specific
opinion distribution, standard theory cannot readily predict what effect polarization
mechanisms will have on the outcome, even when the conditions for their activation
are met.
The second question of concern, how group polarization is affected by communi-
cation network structure, has received little attention. Communication in real-world
decision-making groups is often concentrated within subgroups due to friendship,
factional, or functional divides; covert groups may impose a more limited network
structure upon themselves to minimize detection. Only one previous study has ex-
perimentally investigated group polarization with respect to different communication
network topologies: no effect of topology was reported although the polarization effect
itself was largely absent (Friedkin 1999).
The final question involves the reference point itself, intrinsic to the very definition
of group polarization. Although its initial discovery was instrumental in empirically
anticipating whether groups would undergo risky or cautious shifts (Brown 1986),
the switch to the experimental use of Likert scales with defined neutral points helped
marginalize the reference point as a theoretical concern. However, in natural decision-
making settings, such as foreign policy crises, it is not always clear as to where the
reference point should be set. No broad guidance governing reference point selection
criteria exists and, as our experimental results reveal, even the obvious choice can be
misleading.
Other accounts of group polarization beyond the informational and normative the-
ories have been subsequently proffered but have not received as intense experimental
scrutiny (McGarty et al. 1992; Zuber, Crott, and Werner 1992; Ohtsubo et al. 2002).
One explanation, which we refer to as “extremist-tilting,” attributes group polariza-
tion to traits, such as stubbornness or confidence, of extremists themselves that give
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them outsized influence (Kerr 1992). Extremist-tilting is the prevalent approach to
extremism within the opinion network modeling literature (Deffuant et al. 2002; Xie
et al. 2011; Waagen et al. 2015). Extremist-tilting has been specifically advanced
within social influence network theory (Friedkin 2015; Friedkin and Johnsen 2011).
Social influence network theory assumes a linear dynamic process whereby an indi-
vidual’s opinion is updated as a weighted average of those of others and their own.
It is implemented via the Friedkin-Johnsen model, which contains another prominent
model, the DeGroot model (DeGroot 1974), as a special case.
Rhetorically-Induced Asymmetry
We consider deliberations over a quantitative policy such as wagers, investments,
interest rates, or military operation sizes. A mathematically idealized caricature of
the deliberative process would then have group members stating only their numeri-
cal policy values and then updating their own positions in response, perhaps in an
iterative fashion. More prosaically, group members exchange persuasive messages in-
volving facts and reasoning relevant to the policy question. If discussion is dominated
by a single dimension of the policy question, the relative spacing of group member
positions along this dimension need not be the same as along the policy itself. Such
distortion may reduce the distance within some subgroups relative to others, thereby
affecting the composition of the majority that emerges during deliberations. The
distinction between policy and the rhetoric (in its general sense encompassing sub-
stantive, not merely stylistic, persuasive speech) by which it is discussed can therefore
be consequential to the outcome of deliberations.
Accordingly, a different conceptualization of the deliberative process than the
idealized direct exchange of policy positions involves members exchanging messages
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over a dominant “rhetorical issue.” Then, if a message is indeed persuasive, a mem-
ber can update their position in the direction advocated by the message. While
persuasive messages concerning the rhetorical issue may be expressed in purely qual-
itative language, rhetorical issue positions can be quantitatively related, however
loosely, to numerical policy positions via some transformation which we refer to as
the ”rhetorical function.” If the rhetorical function is nonlinear, then the distribution
of rhetorical issue positions will be reshaped relative to the policy distribution. In
particular, a symmetric policy distribution can be skewed into an asymmetric rhetor-
ical one favoring either the moderate or extreme ends, thereby motivating the label
of rhetorically-induced asymmetry.1
A concave rhetorical function, in which the rhetorical issue position increases more
slowly as the policy increases, will tend to induce groups to shift toward the extreme
(a convex rhetorical function will lead to systematic shifts toward the reference, but
such depolarization is not of concern here). Figure 1 illustrates the effect of concavity
for a rhetorical function ρ(x) relating rhetorical issue ρ to policy x. The zero policy
reference demarcates opposing sides of the policy. Note that the policy and rhetorical
reference points are offset — a consequence of heuristic issue substitution to be dis-
cussed below but not required for the basic RIA effect. We consider the F1,2,3 triad
located on the positive policy axis, indicating that they are on the same policy side.
The spacing between its members is uniform along the policy axis as the moderate F1
and the extremist F3 are both equidistant from F2. If the consensus process involved
a convergence to the policy mean, then the consensus policy should be the policy of
the middle member x2. However, because the F group is arrayed on the shoulder
of the curve, their rhetorical positions are not uniformly spaced: the intermediate
member F2 is rhetorically much closer to the extremist F3 than to the moderate F1.
Thus, a symmetric policy distribution is transformed into an asymmetric rhetorical
8
distribution setting the stage for the formation of an extreme majority.
Subjective Probability as Rhetorical Issue
We elaborate upon the nature of the rhetorical function in the context of decision
making under risk and uncertainty (Pleskac, Diederich, and Wallsten 2015). Consider
an event with two exclusive outcomes — for example, whether a nation’s economy will
grow or contract or the winning candidate in an election — of primary importance
to a policy decision such as the level of an investment. Group members, even if they
have identical utilities with respect to the value of an outcome, may differ as to their
assessments of the probability of that outcome and hence prefer different policies.
The rhetorical issue upon which policy discussion is focused is then the outcome
probability estimate. In modern theories of decision making, such as prospect theory,
not only is utility generally a nonlinear function of wealth (as in classic expected
utility theory) but the weights used to combine outcome utilities are also nonlinear
functions of probability (reflecting psychological tendencies to over or under-weight
probabilities) (Wakker 2010). Consequently, the relationship between the subjective
probability and the optimal policy will, in general, be nonlinear.
We take the rhetorical issue to be the subjective probability estimate of one of the
two outcomes in a binary gamble. When the stakes are small, then an individual’s
wager will not only increase with their subjective probability estimate but do so
at an accelerating rate. As we show in the Supplementary Material, this convex
(upward curving) dependence of wager upon probability arises under both expected
utility and prospect theories using an exponential form of the utility function and
so is quite general (Wakker 2010:80-81).2 The rhetorical function, however, is how
the rhetorical issue depends upon the policy. The convex dependence above then
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Figure 1: Relationship of rhetorical issue to policy illustrating RIA and reference
point shifting. Short lines at bottom show alternative F group consensus policies,
from left to right: inverse of the rhetorical mean x(ρ¯); mean policy x¯ = x2; RPM
model policy x¯23 = (x2 + x3)/2. ASC model acceptance functions in gray at bottom.
ρ(x) = 1/(1 + e−β(x−x0)) with β = 0.13, x0 = −5.
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yields a concave dependence of the subjective probability upon the wager. Thus, the
rhetorical function is concave, as required by RIA-based polarization.
In our quantitative treatment of the experimental context, we use the simpler
mean-variance approximation of expected utility, which is valid for small wagers
(Eeckhoudt, Gollier, and Schlesinger 2005:11-12). It states that the expected util-
ity of a gamble rises with the mean gain but diminishes with increasing uncertainty,
operationalized as the variance. Consider a binary gamble with two mutually exclu-
sive outcomes A and B, which an individual estimates to have respective probabilities
p and q = 1− p. Assuming p > 1/2, for a $1 wager on A, the mean gain is equal to
2p− 1 and the variance is given by 4p(1− p), as follows from a binomial distribution.
The expected utility U(w) of a wager w is then U(w) = (2p − 1)w − 4αp(1 − p)w2,
where α is an individual’s risk aversion; a larger α representing greater sensitivity
to uncertainty. Note that for a fixed w the variance is greatest for p = 1/2 so that
increasing p has the dual effect of increasing the mean gain while decreasing the vari-
ance around it, thereby enabling w to increase as an accelerating function of p. More
precisely, finding the maximum expected utility by setting the derivative of U with
respect to w equal to zero yields the optimal wager as a function of probability:
w =
2p− 1
8αp(1− p) . (1)
We need not take the second derivative of Equation 1 to recognize that it is an
accelerating function of p (for p > 1/2) given that w → ∞ as p → 1. The inverse
transformation, which defines the rhetorical function, therefore yields probability as
a concave function of the wager. For p < 1/2, outcome B is more likely and one
should replace p by q in Equation 1 in order to avoid negative wagers. However, if
we employ the artifice of assigning negative wagers to bets on B, then we can extend
11
Equation 1 to represent B bets as well. This allows use of a single policy axis and
single rhetorical function with positive and negative wagers corresponding to opposite
policy sides as in Figure 1.
Relevant to our experiment, Equation 1 is derived in Woodland and Woodland
(1991) for the specific case of spread betting. In spread betting, the terms “favorite”
and “underdog” are used to refer, respectively, to the likely winner and loser of the
game itself. The point spread is the expected margin of victory of the favorite team
as set by Las Vegas oddsmakers. A bet on the favorite is successful if its margin of
victory exceeds the spread; otherwise a bet on the underdog is successful (ignoring
very rare ties). The spread is set with the intent of equalizing the odds of winning
a bet on either team (Simmons and Nelson 2006). Consequently, the payoff is the
same regardless of whether one bets on the favorite or underdog. Taking A above to
represent the outcome of the favorite’s victory margin exceeding the spread and p as
an individual’s subjective probability estimate of that outcome, then Equation 1 yields
the wager with a positive (negative) wager signifying a bet on the favorite (underdog).
Inverting the relationship shows that the subjective probability of a successful favorite
bet, p(w), is a concave function of the wager for w > 0 as plotted in Figure 2. Note
that the convexity of p(w) for w < 0 results from the use of Equation 1 with the
negative underdog wager convention; directly plotting the probability of a successful
underdog bet, q(w), reveals the required concave form as the wager (magnitude)
grows. The overall S-shape of p(w) therefore reflects the underlying concavity for
both sides of the bet.
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Figure 2: Relationship between subjective probabilities and wager amount. Negative
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given by Equation 5 with α = 0.067. q(w) = 1 − p(w) is probability of underdog
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Heuristic Issue Substitution
RIA can occur even for a “proper” rhetorical issue that accurately corresponds to
the policy. The neutral point for a proper rhetorical issue maps over to the policy
reference so that opposing rhetorical sides fully align with opposing policy sides. For
example, in the binary gamble above, the neutral point for the subjective probability,
p(w), is 1/2 which indeed transforms to a zero wager, the policy reference. Often,
however, when faced with a complex decision, people exhibit a behavior known as
attribute substitution, in which a judgment on a target attribute is addressed by
using a heuristic attribute more accessible to the mind (Kahneman and Frederick
2002). In group discussion, attribute substitution can lead to replacing the proper
rhetorical issue by an “improper” rhetorical issue whose neutral point does not map
to the policy reference. This misalignment between the rhetorical and policy reference
points can cause RIA to vary by policy side which generates differential polarization
as described in the next section.
To illustrate the variation in RIA caused by heuristic issue substitution, we return
to Figure 1. The offset between the policy and rhetorical references signifies that the
rhetorical issue displayed is an improper one.3 While the members of the U triad
are all on the same (negative) side of the policy axis, they straddle the rhetorical
reference, resulting in the U group being arrayed along the roughly linear part of the
curve in contrast to the F group on the shoulder. The U group therefore is subject to
a much less pronounced RIA effect than the F group: U2 is nearly equidistant from
both the moderate U1 and the extremist U3 along the rhetorical issue.
In our experiment involving betting on NFL games, the subjective probability
of the favorite winning against the spread (being the “spread victor”) is the proper
rhetorical issue and results in equivalent RIA effects for both favorite and underdog
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sides of the gamble. Although professional gamblers may be able to directly discuss
the spread victor probability, most knowledgeable NFL fans are more prepared to
discuss the game victor probability — directly applying their knowledge of teams’
relative strengths and weaknesses to consider which team is likely to win the game.
We therefore expect that the game victor probability will be used as a heuristic
substitute for the spread victor probability. Discussion of this issue need not involve
explicit mention of probability assessments, quantitative or qualitative, only that
arguments have clear implications regarding the team whose chances they support.
An empirical basis for expecting the above issue substitution in our experiment
is provided by the origin of the strong bias toward selecting favorites in NFL spread
betting, even though individuals are aware that the spread evens the odds on average,
as observed by Simmons and Nelson (2006). They explain this bias via the operation
of an intuitive confidence heuristic in which the initial assessment of a spread bet is
guided by an individual’s subjective probability concerning who will win the game
not beat the spread. Issue substitution then represents the transition of this heuristic
from fast System 1 thinking into the focus of discussion in deliberative System 2
thinking (Kahneman and Frederick 2002).
The game and spread victor questions can be regarded as two distinct gambles
that rely on the same underlying random variable, the margin of victory, but with
different thresholds for resolving the outcome: zero and the spread respectively. As a
result, their subjective probabilities yield different reference wagers as seen in Figure 2.
A spread victor probability of 1/2 corresponds to a zero wager rhetorical reference
whereas a game victor probability of 1/2 yields a negative wager as the rhetorical
reference (since 1/2 represents the belief that, counter to the oddsmakers, there is no
favorite and so the spread is too high, implying an underdog bet). Thus, discussion
of the game victor question results in using an improper rhetorical issue.
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The spread betting context points to more general conditions of heuristic issue
substitution and reference point shifting. They are expected when two different gam-
bles, one complex and the other more intuitive, can be associated with the same scalar
random variable but with different thresholds. The subjective probability of the intu-
itive gamble is then substituted for that of the complex gamble although the latter is
the proper rhetorical issue. In investing, for example, the variable might be the return
of a company’s stock over a given time period; the policy gamble being whether the
actual return exceeds the fixed return of a zero-risk asset such as a bond. However,
group discussion may focus on the simpler, intuitive gamble concerning whether the
stock’s price will rise or fall; the thresholds for the policy and intuitive gambles are
the fixed and zero returns respectively.
Rhetorically-Proximate Majority Formation
On its own, RIA does not explain group polarization. It must be combined with a
mechanism for reaching a consensus position. Simply taking the policy corresponding
to the mean rhetorical issue position, x(ρ¯), would yield depolarization as shown in
Figure 1. The consensus process in our rhetorically-proximate majority model incor-
porates majority influence. In Figure 1, the pair that is rhetorically more proximate,
(F2, F3), forms a majority at a policy intermediate between them, a position to which
the outlier F1 then concurs, leading to a policy more extreme than the mean x2.
Assuming that the members of the rhetorically-proximate pair have equal influence
in the deliberations, the intermediate policy should be the average of their policy
positions, x¯23 ≡ (x2 + x3)/2. Thus, the introduction of the rhetorical issue serves to
facilitate, via RIA, agreement between the more extreme members who then average
their policies, which are explicitly quantitative unlike the rhetorical issue itself. While
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the majority formed is emergent — arising during discussion rather than present from
the start as in classical majority influence experiments — such emergent majorities
have been found to be highly predictive of the outcomes of discrete choice experi-
ments in what has been referred to as a “momentum effect” (Kerr 1992). Similarly,
for quantitative judgments, the central position within a majority cluster of proxi-
mate positions has been observed to be a better predictor than the central tendency
of the whole group (Davis et al. 1997; Ohtsubo et al. 2002).
The RPM model as described above immediately yields a prediction for the effect
of disagreement level on group polarization. Specifically, we consider increasing the
policy distance between the two outermost members while the mean stays fixed. This
corresponds to keeping x2 fixed while moving x1 and x3 by equal amounts toward
and away from the policy reference respectively. The rhetorically-proximate majority
still consists of F2 and F3 but they now converge at a more extreme policy since their
halfway-point is more extreme. Thus, the RPM model predicts that group polarization
will increase with disagreement level.
The weak level of RIA experienced by the U group leads to the expectation of a
much-reduced group polarization effect. Even if we strictly apply the RPM model
regardless of how slim the rhetorical asymmetry is, the amount of polarization on
average will still be small when uncertainty and random effects are taken into account.
In Figure 1, the RPM position would be the average of the U2 and U3 policies, x¯23,
which would represent a considerable shift toward the extreme compared with x2.
However, uncertainty and noise could readily shift the rhetorically-proximate pair
to (U1, U2) so that the policy would be x¯12, representing a depolarization instead.
Therefore, given the looseness with which policies correspond to rhetorical positions
as well as stochastic effects in the discussion itself, the final policy over many groups
will average out to nearly x2 yielding little systematic polarization. In contrast, the
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effect of the offset rhetorical reference upon the F groups is to shift them further
toward the shoulder of the rhetorical function, thereby increasing the RIA effect.
Synthesizing, we arrive at a prediction relating the reference point to polarization
by policy side: When heuristic issue substitution results in an offset between the
rhetorical and policy references, group polarization will be enhanced on the policy side
that does not contain the rhetorical reference and suppressed on the side that does.
Formally, we consider a triad whose members have initial policy positions (x1, x2, x3),
where x2 is intermediate between x1 and x3, and rhetorical issue positions ρj ≡ ρ(xj).
Denoting the difference ∆ρij = ρj − ρi, the final group policy xf in the RPM model
is given by the weighted average of the pair with the smaller rhetorical distance:
xf =
 (ν12x2 + ν21x1)/(ν12 + ν21), |∆ρ12| ≤ |∆ρ32|(ν32x2 + ν23x3)/(ν32 + ν23), |∆ρ12| > |∆ρ32|, (2)
where the communication weights νij account for the communication rate from j to
i.
We treat the communication weights using simple topological considerations. Our
experiment involved triads in complete and chain networks. In the complete network,
all members (“nodes”) could communicate with each other. As we expect that, on
average, the communication rates will be the same for all nodes, we set νij = 1/2
for all dyads in the complete network. In the chain, the ends of the chain, x1 and
x3, could only communicate with the center node whereas the center node, x2, could
communicate with both ends (separately or simultaneously). If the sequence in which
messages are sent follows the chain path and the center node always sends its messages
to both outer nodes, then we expect node 2 to have twice the communication rate with
each of nodes 1 and 3. We therefore set ν12 = ν32 = 1 and ν21 = ν23 = 1/2.
4 These
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communication rate expectations are approximately borne out in our experiment (see
Supplementary Material).
We can now address the effect of network structure on group polarization. The
consensus policy in the complete network is given by the straight average of the
policies of the rhetorically-proximate pair as described above. In the chain, however,
the rhetorically-proximate majority position is skewed toward the center node given
that it has twice the weight of the extreme node with which RIA facilitates pairing.
The consensus policy for the chain is therefore less extreme than for the complete
network (xf = (2/3)x2 + (1/3)x3 vs. xf = (1/2)x2 + (1/2)x3). Consequently, we
predict that complete networks will exhibit greater group polarization than chains.
Simulation results displaying this effect as well as those for issue substitution and
disagreement are shown below (see Figure 5).
A straightforward way of extending the RPM model to larger networks is to define
the rhetorically-proximate majority as the set of nodes comprising the majority that
spans the minimum range over the rhetorical issue. The final policy is then given by
the weighted average policy within this set; each node’s policy is weighted by the sum
of its outgoing communication weights to the other nodes in the set divided by the
sum of all the communication weights among set members.
Method
Triads of NFL fans engaged in online discussions concerning how much to wager on
the outcome of a weekly NFL game (Figure 3).5 The wager was with respect to
the point spread. Figure 3 shows the Seahawks as the favorite by 8 points over the
Cardinals. A bet on the Seahawks is successful if they win by more than 8 points;
otherwise, a bet on the Cardinals is successful. To provide real stakes to the task,
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discussion participants were given a $7 bonus, to be donated to a specified charity, of
which they could wager all, some, or none. Our use of football games was motivated
by the desire to give participants a task in which they could draw on their natural
knowledge base to forecast the outcome of a real-world event. The risky shift has
been studied previously using other forms of betting (see Myers and Lamm 1976;
Isenberg 1986).
Recruitment. Recruitment took place via Amazon Mechanical Turk. Informed
consent was obtained from all study participants. An initial survey included de-
mographic questions, a knowledge test on NFL teams and players, and a series of
questions on risk tolerance, argumentation, and group discussion. The knowledge
screening consisted of 19 questions that asked respondents to correctly pair team lo-
cations and names and match current season players with teams. Those scoring 80%
and above were eligible to take part in the full experiment. Subjects were allowed to
participate in multiple weeks.
Weekly Pre-Survey. In a weekly pre-survey, given 2-3 days prior to the discus-
sion, subjects were asked to make a choice as to whether or not the favorite’s margin
of victory would exceed the spread and to make a wager on their team choice ranging
from $0 to $7 in whole dollar increments (see Supplementary Material).
Group Assignment.A subset of the pre-survey subjects was used to populate
discussion groups with respect to three dichotomous variables: (1) Policy side condi-
tions were “favorite” and “underdog” in which all members had selected the favorite
or underdog respectively. (2) Disagreement level, the difference between the highest
and lowest wagers in the group, was either “high” or “low” with the possible wager
distributions shown in Figure 3. High disagreement groups had a $7 difference and
low could be $3, $4, or $5. (3) Network structure was either “complete” where all
group members were connected or “chain” where the moderate (w1) and extreme (w3)
20
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wager members were connected only to the intermediate-wager (w2) member. This
alignment of wagers with chain nodes introduces an aspect of the opinion distribution
into the network structure but, as similarity often drives tie formation, such alignment
is often a property of natural groups. Subjects were randomly assigned into complete
or chain networks subject to the requirement to populate groups by policy side and
disagreement level. Members of complete network groups sent and received messages
from all others by default. The center node in the chain had the option of sending
messages to only one or both of the other members (in practice the latter option was
much more frequently used). The end nodes in the chain could only communicate
with the center node.
Discussion Procedure. Discussions were unstructured except for the require-
ment for each individual to make a final wager at the end. Subjects could change
their wager but not their team choice. Group discussion took place online using a
text-based chat system. Upon logging in, participants were presented with a series
of four brief instruction screens that: (1) informed them they would be engaged in a
discussion concerning the upcoming game in which they could earn money for char-
ity; (2) described the structure of their communication network including a pictorial
representation showing which node they occupied; (3) told them that all the members
of the group had chosen the same team and presented the wagering options; and (4)
gave instructions on how to use the chat interface and when and how to make final
wagers. Participants were required to discuss the topic for a minimum of 20 minutes
before they could finalize their wagers although the discussion could continue up to
30 minutes. For five of the games, no requirement for consensus was imposed and
subjects could make different final wagers. In one game (Week 19), consensus was
required. The topic, rules, and wagering options were accessible during the discussion
through a help button. After registering their choices participants were directed to
22
a short post-survey that asked several follow-up questions including their assessment
of group influence and their satisfaction with the outcome.
Group Data. We collected data for six NFL games taking place between De-
cember 2014 and February 2015. 24 groups whose transcripts showed no discussion,
had users drop out prematurely, or did not make final wagers were excluded from the
analysis. This resulted in 197 valid groups. The 169 groups in the five no-consensus
requirement games overwhelmingly reached consensus as shown by the final outcome
distributions: 132 consensus; 29 “majority rule” (only two members with same wa-
ger); and 8 “deadlock” (all different). These 132 consensus groups were added to the
28 groups from the consensus-requirement game to yield the 160 groups used in our
analysis below. See Supplementary Material for games and demographic attributes.
Compensation and Donations. Participants were paid a flat amount for par-
ticipation in the discussion: $8 during regular season play and $16 during the playoffs.
Participants were informed that the $7 charity bonus they received plus (minus) their
winning (losing) wager amount would be donated to the Wounded Warrior Project,
a charity set up to aid wounded US military veterans.6 Participants’ performance in
raising charitable donations was tracked using an online leader board.
Results
Before presenting the results, we cast our theoretical predictions in the context of our
experiment. Note that the F and U groups in Figure 1 are analogous to the favorite
and underdog groups because using the game victor probability as the rhetorical issue
causes the rhetorical reference to split the underdog policy side (Figure 2). We put
forth the following hypotheses:
H1. Favorite groups will exhibit greater group polarization than underdog
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groups.
H2. High disagreement groups will exhibit greater group polarization than low
disagreement groups.
H3. Complete networks will exhibit greater group polarization than chains.
To quantify group polarization, we use the “group shift” defined as the change in
the mean wager of the group after discussion: δ = w¯f − w¯0 where w¯0 and w¯f are,
respectively, the initial and post-discussion mean wagers. A positive δ indicates an
increase in the mean wager and hence group polarization, more specifically, a risky
shift. A negative δ indicates a cautious shift. We restrict our analysis to consensus
groups in which all members make the same final wager. The focus on consensus is in
keeping with the great majority of past experiments and also reflects the low sample
sizes of the non-consensus outcomes.
Table 1 shows the mean group shift δ¯ for specified variable conditions along with
the difference between the δ¯ values for the paired conditions. For policy side, the
favorite groups exhibit a risky shift of $1.44 which is highly significant compared
with a null shift whereas the underdogs show an insignificant positive shift of $0.19.
The difference between their shifts is similarly highly significant. Consequently, we
conclude that the favorite groups exhibit a risky shift and the underdog groups do
not. Regarding disagreement level and network structure, for favorite groups: high
disagreement shows a significantly greater shift than low; and the complete network
shows a significantly greater shift than the chain. In addition, each favorite condition
displays a shift that is significantly greater than null. The underdog groups show no
disagreement or network effects consistent with the overall absence of an underdog
risky shift. These results confirm all three hypotheses above.7
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Condition n δ¯ ($) SE ($) p(δ¯) ∆δ¯ ($) p(∆δ¯) t(df )
Favorite 104 1.44*** 0.19 9× 10−12
1.25*** .00008 4.10 (118.7)
Underdog 56 0.19 0.24 .43
Fav./High 60 1.82*** 0.26 4× 10−9
0.89* .014 2.50 (101.4)
Fav./Low 44 0.92*** 0.24 .0004
Fav./Comp. 37 2.10*** 0.30 3× 10−8
1.02** .008 2.73 (76.8)
Fav./Chain 67 1.07*** 0.23 .00001
Und./High 22 0.27 0.54 .62
0.14 .82 0.24 (26.6)
Und./Low 34 0.14 0.20 .49
Und./Comp. 31 0.14 0.32 .67
-0.11 .82 -0.23 (51.0)
Und./Chain 25 0.25 0.37 .50
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001
Table 1: Mean group shifts for specified conditions using the 160 groups with con-
sensus outcomes. n is the number of groups; δ¯ is the the mean of the group shift
δ = w¯f − w¯0 taken over the n groups; SE is its standard error and p(δ¯) is its sta-
tistical significance level as compared to a null shift; ∆δ¯ is the difference between
the δ¯ values of the top and bottom variables in the comparison pair and p(∆δ¯) is its
statistical significance level; t and df are the t-test t-score and degrees of freedom
respectively. Results were obtained using Student’s t-test for the tests of δ¯ relative to
a null shift and Welch’s t-test for the difference ∆δ¯ between two compared conditions.
Two-tailed testing was employed and the null hypothesis was rejected for p < .05.
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The above results are not readily explained by conventional group polarization
theory. The differential polarization by policy side, in particular, is at odds with the
informational and normative theories. A straightforward application of persuasive
arguments theory would predict that both favorite and underdog groups should show
a risky shift given that group members presumably all possess different information
in support of their common team choice. Similarly, social comparison theory would
predict that a norm toward risk-taking (caution) would increase (decrease) wagers
regardless of team choice.
As the standard theories are not integrated with broader social influence pro-
cesses, they make no clear predictions with respect to the effects of disagreement
level. For instance, persuasive arguments theory predicts that the members of a zero-
disagreement group would exchange new information leading to a considerable shift
whereas a consensus-oriented account would predict that they simply reach consen-
sus at their common position. The standard theories are also silent with respect
to network effects. However, a plausible extension of persuasive arguments theory
would predict complete networks to exhibit a greater shift due to the freer flow of
information.
The experimental results can also be considered with respect to the extremist-
tilting explanation. As the wager is a very visible signal of confidence, one would
expect high wager individuals to have greater influence regardless of policy side so
extremist-tilting mistakenly predicts comparable polarization for favorites and un-
derdogs. Extremist-tilting does produce an unambiguous prediction of increasing
polarization with increasing disagreement level because the extremist becomes more
extreme and so more influential. Although extremist-tilting has been proposed within
social influence network theory, the theory makes no claims regarding topology and
polarization and an experiment found no effect of topology (Friedkin 1999).
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Accept-Shift-Constrict Model of Opinion Dynamics
The RPM model is simple and intuitive but does not describe the dynamical process
by which proximate majorities form. To do so, we introduce the accept-shift-constrict
model of opinion dynamics on networks in which majorities emerge and persist as a
consequence of micro-level attitude change dynamics.
The ASC model evolves both the positions and uncertainties of group members in
response to their dyadic interactions. We consider position first, which can be a policy
or, more generally, an opinion about some matter. A persuasive message sent by one
group member to another must first be accepted by the recipient in order to shift their
policy. While a number of factors can affect whether a message is accepted (McGuire
1985), the distance between the message’s rhetorical issue position and the receiver’s
rhetorical issue position plays the key role in our model: if the distance is within
the “latitude of acceptance” (LOA), a term borrowed from social judgment theory
(Sherif and Hovland 1961), the message is likely to be accepted, but the acceptance
probability rapidly decays beyond the LOA. If the message is accepted, then the
receiver’s policy is shifted in proportion to its distance from the sender’s policy.
Formally, we encode the above process as an ordinary differential equation for
xi(t), the policy position of the i
th group member at time t. For a group with N
members, the rate of change of xi is given by
dxi
dt
=
N∑
j=1
κij(xj − xi) exp
{
−1
2
(ρ(xj)− ρ(xi))2
λ2i
}
, (3)
where κij is the coupling strength from j → i and λi is i’s LOA. The matrix formed by
the coupling strengths defines a policy-independent network of influence. In general,
κij depends on communication rate and other factors such as credibility and expertise
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(κii = 0). For our simulations, we simply use the communication weights setting
κij = νij.
The linear xj − xi term in Equation 3 represents the shift effect. The gaussian
term represents the acceptance process and we refer to it as the acceptance function,
a(∆ρ, λ) = e−∆ρ
2/2λ2 . Although the acceptance function is always symmetric with
respect to the sign of the rhetorical difference, a(−∆ρ) = a(∆ρ), a concave ρ(x) can
causes it to appear asymmetric along the policy axis as clearly seen for F2 and F3 in
Figure 1, illustrating how RIA manifests itself directly on policy.
In addition to position change, communication can also affect a person’s uncer-
tainty regarding their position. Group discussion has been observed to increase the
level of certainty that members have in their quantitative judgments (Sniezek 1992;
Davis et al. 1997). Discussion can increase attitude certainty due to the exchange
of new information or simply learning that others share similar opinions (Tormala
2016). Of specific relevance to our experiment, the provision of new information has
been found to reduce the uncertainty in point spread estimates of knowledgeable NFL
fans (Tsai, Klayman, and Hastie 2008). Accordingly, we introduce an uncertainty re-
duction mechanism in our model in which messages from those with similar positions
constrict an individual’s LOA so that they become more resistant to persuasion from
distant positions. Messages originating within the LOA that are accepted decrease
the LOA, but not beneath a certain minimum value λmin. This yields for the LOA
dynamics:
dλi
dt
=

∑N
j=1 κij(λmin − λi)e−∆ρ
2
ij/2λ
2
i , |∆ρij| ≤ λi
0, |∆ρij| > λi.
(4)
Equations 3 and 4 comprise the ASC model. Taking ρ(x) = x, Equation 3 is equiv-
alent to the model of Gabbay (2007) without the self-influence force which models
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a persistent effect of an individual’s initial opinion. The uncertainty reduction dy-
namics represented by Equation 4 is novel in opinion network modeling. The model
of Deffuant et al. (2002) includes a dyadic uncertainty interaction that results in un-
certainty change only when dyad members have different uncertainties; this requires
that uncertainty levels be visible to other group members, an assumption not present
in Equation 4, and does not allow equally uncertain individuals to mutually reinforce
their opinions.
A crucial consequence of the uncertainty reduction dynamics in the ASC model is
the ability for interim majorities to more effectively maintain their position in the face
of minority influence. Figure 4a illustrates this effect for a complete-network triad in
which the intermediate member’s position is taken to be halfway between the others.
However, for sufficiently low initial disagreement, an interim majority will not form
and the group equilibrium will be close to its initial mean (Figure 4b).
The emergence and persistence of proximate majorities is not possible in the
DeGroot and Friedkin-Johnsen models as the mean opinion will always be constant
when members interact via symmetric network weights since dyad members exert
equal and opposite forces on each other. Because of this constant mean property,
the statistically significant deviation from the mean observed in Friedkin (1999) (but
not systematically polarized) was attributed to asymmetries in network weights in
the Friedkin-Johnsen model rather than the alternative explanation of the influence
of a proximate majority as concluded in other experiments (Davis 1996; Davis et al.
1997; Ohtsubo et al. 2002). This property also forces extremist-tilting upon social
influence network theory in order to explain group polarization but does so at the
cost of always predicting polarization whenever a group is on the same policy side.
The persistence of majority positions on a continuous opinion axis is also found in
the agent-based model of Moussaid et al. (2013), which involves a confidence variable
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that must be transmitted between agents along with opinions, rather than our use of
an uncertainty interval not visible to others.
The ability of the ASC model to produce the same qualitative effects observed
in the RPM model and experimentally is illustrated in the simulations of Figure 5.
For the proper rhetorical issue (coincident references), both policy sides exhibit equal
polarization that increases with disagreement level and with the complete network
showing more polarization than the chain (Figure 5a,b). The improper rhetorical issue
(offset references), however, shows substantial polarization for positive policies and
little for negative ones (Figure 5c,d). The polarization shift for the ASC model is lower
than for the RPM model because, in the former, the proximate majority does yield
some ground to the minority member. Figure 5 also clearly shows that our models
can predict depolarizing shifts for some groups even when the dominant behavior is
polarizing, unlike the informational, normative, and extremist-tilting theories.
Quantitative Model Application to Experiment Data
Prior to presenting data-driven simulation results, we derive the rhetorical function,
ρ(w), to be used in the simulations. If the proper rhetorical issue were used, we could
simply invert Equation 1 to solve for the subjective probability of a favorite spread
victory:
p(w) =
1
2
− 1
8αw
± 1
2
√
1 +
1
16α2w2
, (5)
where the + (−) sign implies bets on the favorite (underdog). p(w) is plotted in
Figure 2. Its shape suggests that even professional gamblers who do not engage in
heuristic issue substitution would exhibit RIA-based polarization.
Issue substitution requires calculating the subjective probability of a favorite game
victory. The game and spread victor gambles both depend upon the margin of victory,
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Figure 4: Position and LOA trajectories in ASC model for a complete network. Solid
curves show policy positions, dashed curves show LOAs. (a) High initial policy dis-
agreement (x3 − x1 = 10) showing substantial shift between consensus and initial
mean policy (x2(0)). (b) Lower initial policy disagreement (7) results in near simul-
taneous convergence close to initial policy mean. λ1,2,3(0) = 0.05, λmin = 0.025; ρ(x)
as in Figure 1.
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Figure 5: ASC and RPM simulations with variability in intermediate node policy.
ρ(x) taken as in Figure 1. Top row shows proper rhetorical issue (x0 = 0) for (a)
complete network and (b) chain network. Bottom row shows improper rhetorical issue
(x0 = −5) for (c) complete network and (d) chain network. Positive and negative
policy sides are on positive and negative horizontal axis respectively. Polarization
shift, δ = x¯(tf ) − x¯(0), plotted as a function of the initial policy disagreement, ∆ =
x3 − x1. Shift toward the extreme corresponds to δ > 0 for positive policy side and
δ < 0 for negative side. The position of the intermediate node was varied according
to x2 = ±(6 + ) for the positive and negative policy sides and where  takes on 41
uniformly-spaced values over the interval [−1, 1]. x1 = 6−∆/2 and x3 = 6 + ∆/2 for
∆ > 0 and analogously for ∆ < 0. RPM (dashed) and ASC (solid) means are over all
 values. Shifts for individual  values shown as gray curves for ASC model. Dotted
curve shows  = 0 ASC baseline case where x2 = 6 is exactly in middle. Gap in the
curves is the region where x2 would go beyond x1 or x3. ASC model parameters:
λ1,2,3(0) = 0.05, λmin = 0.025.
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which we take to be a normally distributed random variable z with standard deviation
σ. The spread s0 is the estimated mean of z according to the oddsmakers but an
individual may have a different estimate s. The subjective probability of favorite game
victory is given by the cumulative probability that z > 0: ρ(s) = 1
2
erfc
(−s/(σ√2))
where erfc(x) = 2√
pi
∫∞
x
e−v
2
dv. The function ρ(s) is concave for s > 0. That NFL fans
have an intuitive understanding of this concave relationship — that the probability
of game victory flattens out as the expected margin of victory increases — has been
observed empirically (Simmons and Nelson 2006:422).
A similar expression holds for the probability of the favorite winning against the
spread: p(s) = 1
2
erfc
(−(s− s0)/(σ√2)). If s > s0, then p > 0.5 and one should bet
on the favorite. One can then solve for s as a function of p, which in turn can be
written as a function of w using Equation 5. Substituting for s in ρ(s) above then
yields:
ρ(w) =
1
2
erfc
{
erfc−1 (2p(w))− s0
σ
√
2
}
. (6)
As for p(w), ρ(w) is concave for w > 0 as displayed in Figure 2.
We use ρ(w) in our simulations assuming identical risk aversion α and standard
deviation σ. Rather than using α directly, we define the more intuitive parameter
pmax which corresponds to the subjective probability p(wmax) for which an individual
will make the maximum wager, wmax = $7; α can then be calculated via α = (2pmax−
1)/(8wmaxpmax(1 − pmax)). While pmax is a free parameter, we fix σ = 12.8, which
is the empirical standard deviation for the margin of victory in NFL games (Sapra
2008). The derivation of ρ(w) represents a first-principles calculation that relates the
rhetorical issue to contextually meaningful parameters and hence represents a more
stringent test than using an arbitrary S-shaped function. It also emphasizes that
even if both favorite and underdog wagers are arrived at by a rational procedure,
33
heuristic substitution of the probability of a favorite game victory in discussion leads
to differential polarization.
Figure 6 shows our experimental data and simulation results as a function of the
initial wager difference, w3 − w1. Each group is simulated using its initial wagers
w1, w2, w3 and the spread s0 for the game of concern. As subjects could only make
whole dollar wagers, the ASC and RPM models are supplemented with a normative
rounding scheme: a norm toward risk-taking is assumed so that final simulated wagers
are rounded upward to the nearest dollar for both favorite and underdog groups. The
only free parameter for the RPM model is pmax to which the ASC models adds λmin
and λ1,2,3(0) (all equal). Values of the free parameters were selected so as to minimize
the χ2 error summed over both networks. For the RPM model, a one-parameter
χ2 goodness-of-fit test, which takes as its null hypothesis that the model is correct,
yields a probability Q = 0.61 that χ2 could have exceeded the observed value of 9.1
by chance. For the ASC model, a three-parameter test yields Q = 0.30 for χ2 = 10.7.
With a conservative threshold of Q < 0.2 (as has been used previously (Davis et al.
1997; Ohtsubo et al. 2002)) for rejecting the null hypothesis, both models are found
consistent with the data.
We have also tested alternative models, all of which fail (see Supplementary Mate-
rial): (1) the median wager (Q = 10−10); (2) a proximate majority rule based directly
on the wager (Q = 7 × 10−4); (3) a linear combination based on intuitive confi-
dence with wagers weighted by the game victor subjective probability (Q = 0.005);
(4) the Abelson (1964) model, a continuous time equivalent to the DeGroot model,
with extremist-tilting based on the wager (Q = 0.009); (5) the Abelson model with
extremist-tilting based on intuitive confidence (Q = 0.09).
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Figure 6: Mean polarization shift δ¯ vs. initial wager difference, w3−w1, for data and
RPM and ASC simulations. (a) Complete network. (b) Chain network. Favorite
groups shown on the positive x axis, underdogs on the negative. δ¯ is mean of δ =
|w¯|f−|w¯0| over groups at each point and is defined so that δ > 0 indicates a risky shift
for both favorite and underdog groups. Experimental data shown as circles. Error
bars are standard errors. Sample sizes from left to right: chain: 12, 6, 6, 15, 14, 38.
complete: 10, 6, 13, 5, 9, 22 (no $5 disagreement groups were used as there were only
four total). pmax = 0.71 for RPM. pmax = 0.7, λ1,2,3(0) = 0.03, λmin = 0.01 for ASC.
ρ(w) given by Equation 6 with σ = 12.8. χ2 values are the sum of the squared errors
between the simulated and the experimental values normalized by the standard error
at each data point.
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Discussion
We have presented experimental results that challenge standard theories of group
polarization and have proposed an alternative theory. Our theory links RIA with
the familiar social influence phenomena of majority influence and consensus pressure.
The concavity of the rhetorical function compresses the rhetorical distance between
group members with more extreme policies relative to more moderate ones. This
distortion facilitates the emergence of extreme majorities that drive the ultimate
group consensus yielding a shift toward the policy extreme relative to the initial policy
mean — the definition of group polarization. Heuristic issue substitution can shift the
reference point as well, with the rhetorical reference being the consequential divide
for polarization. Both the RPM and ASC models qualitatively and quantitatively
agree with our experimental results involving greater polarization for favorites than
underdogs, as disagreement level increases, and for complete networks as compared
with chains.
RIA-based polarization can operate concurrently with the informational and nor-
mative routes. Yet our theory’s ability to be implemented via formal models that
can make predictions for specific opinion distributions speaks to its particular mer-
its. In contrast, conventional theory always predicts polarization for groups with
homogeneous leanings even if majority influence would predict depolarization. The
RIA-based mechanism surmounts difficulties faced by attempts to account for group
polarization through majority influence alone, such as its occurrence for symmetric
opinion distributions (Myers and Lamm 1976:611-613).
We grounded our discussion of the rhetorical function in the theory of decision
making under risk and uncertainty. Its concavity even for a proper rhetorical issue
suggests that policy experts, presumably less prone to heuristic substitution, will also
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exhibit RIA-based polarization. This concavity arises from risk aversion, a corner-
stone of decision theory, and so is more generally applicable than the experimental
context (at least for small stakes). That RIA induces a risky shift then implies that
group discussion tempers the risk aversion of individuals. While the economics lit-
erature has found mixed results regarding whether groups are less risk averse than
individuals (Sutter 2007; Baker, Laury, and Williams 2008), these experiments have
involved lotteries with known probabilities whereas probability uncertainty is intrinsic
to our experiment and theory and attitude change more broadly.
The development of opinion network models supported by experiment will advance
computational social science approaches to the dynamics of social influence. Opinion
network modeling has grown rapidly in recent years reaching into physics and other
disciplines (Castellano, Fortunato, and Loreto 2009). The proliferation of models,
however, has far outpaced their experimental investigation. The most extensively-
tested model, the Friedkin-Johnsen model, has primarily relied upon subject post-
discussion ratings of interpersonal influence to estimate network weights within indi-
vidual groups (Friedkin and Johnsen 2011; Dippong, Kalkhoff, and Johnsen 2017). In
contrast, our quantitative testing involved network weights set by a priori topological
considerations and the fitting of parameters universal to all groups, a procedure both
more data-parsimonious and not dependent upon subjects’ outcome-shaped percep-
tions.
The ASC model describes a dual process of opinion and uncertainty change based
on the greater acceptance rate of messages within one’s LOA and the decrease in
LOA due to exposure to similar views. A key dynamic in the model is the ability of
proximate majorities to form and persist for symmetric networks and uniform initial
LOAs, thereby enabling majorities to exert outsized influence, shifting the mean even
in the absence of RIA (RIA systematically skews the shift). The ASC model concep-
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tualizes distinct dimensions of opinion and rhetoric: opinion is an evaluation directly
tied to a decision or other behavioral outcome of interest while rhetoric determines
whether messages aimed at shifting opinions are found persuasive. Consequently, the
ASC model can generate systematic shifts toward the extreme due to the structure
of the decision problem rather than by privileging initial conditions that correlate
influence with extremity as typically assumed in opinion network modeling.
Notes
1RIA differs from the “rhetorical asymmetry” of Schkade, Sunstein, and Kahneman
(2000) which states that it is easier to argue in favor of one direction of a policy,
an anisotropy that operates even at the dyadic level whereas RIA affects majority
formation.
2Unlike power laws, the other main form, exponential utility functions are well-
behaved near zero, a possibility in our experiment.
3As indicated in Figure 1, we refer to the transformation of the neutral point of
the rhetorical issue onto the policy axis simply as the “rhetorical reference.” The
policy reference is always zero.
4The communication weights are normalized so that they sum to the same (arbi-
trary) value in both networks.
5This human subjects research was approved by the University of Washington In-
stitutional Review Board and the Defense Threat Reduction Agency Research Over-
sight Board.
6A total of $6756.50 was donated.
7To check for the possible effects of non-normal distributions, nonparametric test-
ing was conducted. Very similar results to Table 1 were obtained (see Supplementary
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Material).
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Supplementary Notes
Wager-Probability Relationship under Prospect and Expected
Utility Theories
We show that the wager is a convex function of the subjective probability in a binary
gamble in which one can wager any part of an initial bonus as in our experiment.
We denote the bonus by w0 and the wager by w. If the bet is successful, then one
S1
gets w0 + w total; otherwise, one is left with w0 − w. The utility of a winning bet is
u(w0 +w) and that of a losing bet u(w0−w). The outcomes are denoted by A and B
and we assume that one’s subjective probability estimate of A occurring is p ≥ 1/2.
We use the formalism of prospect theory which can then be used for the special case
of expected utility result as well. We assume operation in the domain of gains. This is
applicable to our experiment since subjects have not yet had time to psychologically
adapt to the bonus w0 and, furthermore, since the money is going to charity, any
amount raised is viewed as a gain. In prospect theory, the function V (w) that one
seeks to maximize is, for a two-outcome prospect in the domain of gains, given by
V (w) = ω(p)u(w0 + w) + (1− ω(p))u(w0 − w), (S1)
where ω(p) is the decision weight for probability p (Wakker 2010:230).
For the utility function, we choose the common exponential form
u(x) =
1− e−θx
θ
, (S2)
where θ is the risk aversion (θ > 0) (Wakker 2010:80). The derivative u′(x) → 1 as
x→ 0 so the exponential is well-behaved near zero and hence more suitable for small
wagers than the power law form (with power less than one) whose derivative blows
up at zero. The exponential utility function is plotted in Figure S1a for prospect
theory and expected utility theory (using their respective θ values corresponding to
Equation S5 below).
The decision weights can be represented by the following form (Wakker 2010:207–
208):
ω(p) =
bpγ
bpγ + (1− p)γ , (S3)
S2
where γ is a positive parameter that affects the curvature and b is a positive parameter
that sets the weight at p = 1/2 via ω(1/2) = b/(1 + b); b < 1 implies ω(1/2) < 1/2
reflecting an underweighting of an even chance. Empirical work in prospect theory
typically finds b < 1 and γ < 1 implying pessimism and the overweighting of small
probabilities and the underweighting of high ones. Figure S1b plots a typical decision
weight form ω(p) as found in experiments, using b = 0.7 and γ = 0.6 . Also plotted is
the weighting used in expected utility theory, ω = p, corresponding to b = 1, γ = 1.
Our binary gamble, where one bets on the outcome believed to be more likely (taken
to be A here), implies that only decision weights ω(p) ≥ 1/2 are of concern. In this
regime, ω is always lower than p until one reaches certainty so that ω has to increase
at an accelerating rate in order to catch back up at p = 1. In other words, it has
positive curvature ω′′ > 0.
To find the optimal wager, we maximize V (w) by setting V ′(w) equal to zero
obtaining
u′(w + w0)
u′(w − w0) =
1− ω(p)
ω(p)
,
which can be solved for the wager
w(p) =
1
2θ
log
(
ω(p)
1− ω(p)
)
. (S4)
The risk aversion θ can now be expressed in terms of the probability pmax at which
an individual bets the maximum wager w0:
θ =
1
2w0
log
(
ω(pmax)
1− ω(pmax)
)
. (S5)
The wager as a function of probability, w(p), is plotted in Figure S2. It is seen to
be convex for both prospect and expected utility theories. Lowering the risk aversion
S3
by lowering pmax decreases the curvature while maintaining convexity. The convexity
of w(p) implies the concavity of the subjective probability as a function of the wager,
p(w), as required by RIA-based polarization.
We can show that w(p) is convex in general for prospect theory in the regime of
interest by considering the curvature directly as given by the second derivative w′′(p).
The first derivative is
w′(p) =
1
2θ
ω′
ω(1− ω) , (S6)
and the second derivative is
w′′(p) =
1
2θ
ω′′(1− ω) + ω′2(2ω − 1)
ω2(1− ω)2 . (S7)
The terms in the numerator are positive because as noted above: in the first term,
the curvature of the decision weight function ω′′(p) is positive; and for the second
term ω(p) > 1/2. Therefore, w′′(p) > 0, which implies that the inverse function p(w)
is concave, consistent with RIA-based polarization.
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Figure S1: Prospect theory (PT) and expected utility (EU) theory forms for: (a)
utility u and (b) decision weights ω. PT: b = 0.7, γ = 0.6. EU: b = 1, γ = 1.
pmax = 0.9.
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Figure S2: Wager (w) vs. subjective probability of successful bet (p) for prospect and
expected utility theories. b, γ, pmax as for Figure S1.
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Quantitative Testing of Alternative Models
Median Policy
The median policy for the experimental triads is always given by w2, the pre-discussion
wager of the intermediate member. It is plotted as a function of disagreement level for
the complete and chain networks in Figure S3. The zero-parameter χ2 goodness-of-fit
test for the median yields Q = 10−10 for χ2 = 72.6.
Policy-Based Proximate Majority
The proximate majority model based on the policies is the same as the RPM model
with the rhetorical issue identical to the policy. In other words, Equation 2 in the
main text with ρi = xi where xi is taken to be the wager wi. The results are plotted in
Figure S3. The zero-parameter χ2 goodness-of-fit test for the policy-based proximate
majority model yields Q = 7× 10−4 for χ2 = 33.9.
Intuitive Confidence-Weighted Aggregation of Policies
This model aggregates policies with weights determined by the intuitive confidence
of Simmons and Nelson (2006), which is set by the probability of game victory for
whichever team one believes more likely to win. Network structure is not taken into
account. The consensus wager wf for the intuitive confidence aggregation model is
given by
wf =
c1w1 + c2w2 + c3w3
c1 + c2 + c3
, (S8)
The intuitive confidence weight ci is the difference between the probability of game
victory and 1/2 (which indicates zero confidence): ci = ρ(wi) − 0.5 for ρ(wi) ≥ 0.5
and ci(wi) = 1− ρ(wi)− 0.5 for ρ(wi) < 0.5 where ρ(w) is the subjective probability
of favorite game victory as given by Equation 6. We set σ = 12.8 for ρ(w) as for
S6
the RPM and ASC simulations and, likewise, we supplement Equation S8 with a
normative-based rounding scheme. pmax is varied to minimize the total χ
2, which
yields pmax = 0.64. The results are plotted in Figure S3. The one-parameter χ
2
goodness-of-fit test for the intuitive confidence aggregation model yields Q = 0.005
for χ2 = 27.0.
Abelson Model with Wager-Based Extremist-Tilting
We first show that the Abelson model is a continuous-time version of the DeGroot
model. The DeGroot model evolves the opinion xi over discrete times tk as
xi(tk+1) =
N∑
j=1
bijxj(tk), (S9)
where bij are the row-stochastic network weights,
∑N
j=1 bij = 1. Formulated as a
difference equation and using the identity xi =
∑N
j=1 bijxi , this becomes
xi(tk+1)− xi(tk) =
N∑
j=1
bij(xj(tk)− xi(tk)). (S10)
Under continuous time, this yields the Abelson model:
dxi
dt
=
N∑
j=1
bij(xj − xi). (S11)
The policy is the wager so we let xi(t) = wi(t). In the wager-based extremist-
tilting scheme, confidence increases with the initial wager w0i ≡ wi(0) (now denoted
explicitly rather than just as wi given the time dependence in the Abelson model).
Rather than using a confidence parameter directly, however, we use the susceptibility
to influence, η, in accordance with social influence network theory. Each member has
S7
a constant ηi with larger values signifying increasing influence from the other group
members relative to one’s own position and hence lower confidence. We take ηi to
depend linearly on the initial wager w0i as follows:
ηi = ηmax − (ηmax − ηmin)w
0
i
$7
, (S12)
so that a person who bets $0 has ηi = ηmax and is least resistant to persuasion whereas
a maximum $7 wager implies highest confidence with ηi = ηmin.
The network weights bij are then defined to integrate susceptibility and the nor-
malized communication weights ν˜ij as follows:
bij =
 ν˜ijηi, i 6= j1− ηi, i = j, (S13)
where
∑N
j=1 ν˜ij = 1 (ν˜ii = 0). The unnormalized communication weights νij are taken
to be the same as used in the RPM and ASC simulations.
Without loss of generality, we set ηmax = 1 (equivalent to the rescaling t→ ηmaxt,
which simply changes how fast equilibrium is reached, not the equilibrium values
themselves). This leaves ηmin as the free parameter. Normative-rounding is employed.
The total χ2 is minimized at χmin = 0.45. Figure S4 displays the results. The one-
parameter χ2 goodness-of-fit test for the Abelson model with wager-based confidence
yields Q = 0.009 for χ2 = 25.0.
Abelson Model with Extremist-Tilting Based on Intuitive Confidence
This variant of the extremist-tilted Abelson model assumes that confidence increases
not with the wager but based on the intuitive confidence. Therefore, the susceptibility
to influence is taken to decrease as the subjective probability of game victory grows
S8
for one’s believed likely winner. Otherwise, this model is the same as the previous
Abelson model. We denote the initial subjective probability of a favorite game victory
by ρ0i ≡ ρ(w0i ) where ρ(w) is given by Equation 6. The susceptibility to influence is
then
ηi =
 2(ηmax − ηmin)ρ
0
i + ηmin, ρ
0
i ≤ 0.5
−2(ηmax − ηmin)(ρ0i − 0.5) + ηmax, ρ0i > 0.5.
(S14)
The top (bottom) equation applies when the underdog (favorite) is thought more
likely to win. The minimum susceptibility, ηmin, is reached when ρ
0
i = 0, 1 while ηmax
is reached when one believes the game is a tossup, ρ0i = 0.5.
We simulate Equation S11 with network weights as given by Equations S13 and
S14. We set σ = 12.8 in ρ(w) as in the main text. The simulation is conducted as for
the previous Abelson model but, in addition to ηmin, pmax is also a free parameter.
Minimizing the total χ2 yields values of pmax = 0.85 and ηmin = 0. The simulation
results are shown in Figure S4. The chain gives a good fit to the data but the complete
network fit is poor. The total χ2 = 16.4 which yields Q = 0.09 under a two-parameter
goodness of fit test.
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Figure S3: Comparison of experimental data with simulations of median, majority,
and intuitive confidence models for (a) complete and (b) chain networks.
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Figure S4: Comparison of experimental data with simulations of Abelson model with
confidence based on the wager (Abel wag) and intuitive confidence (Abel intuit). (a)
Complete network; (b) Chain.
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Supplementary Methods
Weekly Pre-Survey
The weekly pre-survey administered to obtain subject team choice and wager prefer-
ences consisted of the following questions (with team names and spread appropriate
to the upcoming game):
1. Based on your own knowledge do you believe that the Seahawks will cover the spread? To cover the spread,
the Seahawks must win by at least 9 points.
m Yes
m No
2. Suppose you have a $7 bonus for donating to charity, with the potential to bet any amount from $0 to $7.
Based on your answer to the previous question about which team would cover the spread, how much would
you wager that your answer is correct?
m $0 – The charity would get $7 regardless of whether Im right or wrong
m $1 – If I’m right the charity would get $8, if I’m wrong the charity would get $6
m $2 – If I’m right the charity would get $9, if I’m wrong the charity would get $5
m $3 – If I’m right the charity would get $10, if I’m wrong the charity would get $4
m $4 – If I’m right the charity would get $11, if I’m wrong the charity would get $3
m $5 – If I’m right the charity would get $12, if I’m wrong the charity would get $2
m $6 – If I’m right the charity would get $13, if I’m wrong the charity would get $1
m $7 – If I’m right the charity would get $14, if I’m wrong the charity would get $0
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  Chain    Complete   
Node out in out/in out in out/in 
w1 8.968 15.727 0.570 16.071 18.888 0.851 
w2 31.740 17.302 1.834 18.255 17.794 1.026 
w3 8.334 16.013 0.520 19.516 17.162 1.137 
mean 16.347 16.347 0.975 17.947 17.948 1.005 
 
 
  Favorite/Chain   Favorite/Complete  
Node out in out/in out in out/in 
w1 8.930 16.319 0.547 15.362 18.090 0.849 
w2 33.215 16.849 1.971 18.601 16.467 1.130 
w3 7.919 16.896 0.469 17.572 16.980 1.035 
mean 16.688 16.688 0.996 17.179 17.179 1.005 
 
 
  Underdog/Chain   Underdog/Complete  
Node out in out/in out in out/in 
w1 9.069 14.140 0.641 16.917 19.840 0.853 
w2 27.787 18.516 1.501 17.843 19.376 0.921 
w3 9.447 13.647 0.692 21.836 17.380 1.256 
mean 15.435 15.435 0.945 18.865 18.865 1.010 
 
 
Table S1: Average communication rates for chain and complete networks. Top: Com-
bined favorite and underdog groups. Middle: Favorite groups. Bottom: Underdog
groups. “Out” rates are total words per minute sent by node to other group mem-
bers; the words in a message count twice if sent to both other members. “In” rates
are words per minute received by a node. “Out/in” ratios are also displayed. For
the combined chain network, the ratio of the center node’s outgoing message rate to
the incoming messages from the outer nodes is 1.83 in approximate accord with our
modeling assumption of setting the center node’s communication weight to be twice
the outer nodes. For the combined complete network, the outgoing/incoming ratio
of each node ranges from 0.85 to 1.14 in approximate accord with our setting the
complete network nodes to have equal communication weights.
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Supplementary Table 2. NFL games used in experiment.  
 
2014-15 
Season 
Week Favorite Underdog Spread 
Final 
Score 
Game 
Winner 
Wager 
Winner 
REGULAR       
16 Seattle Arizona 8 35-6 FAV FAV 
17 Pittsburgh Cincinnati 3 27-17 FAV FAV 
PLAYOFFS       
18 (Wild 
Card) Pittsburgh Baltimore 3 17-30 UND UND 
19 
(Divisional) Green Bay Dallas 6.5 26-21 FAV UND 
20 
(Conference) 
New 
England Indianapolis 7 45-7 FAV FAV 
22 (Super 
Bowl) 
New 
England Seattle 1 28-24 FAV FAV 
 
Table S2: NFL games used in experiment.
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Race/Ethnicity   
Black 22 
Hispanic 20 
Asian 28 
White 215 
Native American 6 
Other Ethnicity 1 
Decline 0 
Age   
18-30 146 
31-40 83 
41-50 27 
51+ 14 
Declined 5 
Household Income   
Less than $12,500 16 
$12,500 - $24,999 36 
$25,000 - $37,499 50 
$37,500 - $49,999 49 
$50,000 - $62,499 37 
$62,500 - $74,999 24 
$75,000 - $87,499 14 
$87,500 - $99,999 14 
$100,000 or More 27 
Don't know/Decline 8 
Education   
Some High School 3 
High School Graduate 19 
Some College 106 
Bachelor's Degree 105 
Graduate Degree 41 
Decline to Answer 1 
Gender   
Female 69 
Male 203 
Decline to Answer 3 
 
Table S3: Discussion participant demographics.
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Supplementary Table 4. Nonparametric testing of experimental data. n is the number of groups in each 
condition; δ  is mean group shift taken over the n groups; SE, CI, and ( )p δ  are its standard error, 95% 
confidence interval, and p-value; δ∆  is the difference between the δ  values of the comparison pair and 
( )p δ∆  is its p-value. Statistical quantities are calculated using bootstrapping with one million resamples. 
For testing δ∆ , the comparison pair samples were pooled. 
 
Condition n δ ($) SE ($) CI ($) ( )p δ  δ∆ ($) ( )p δ∆  
Favorite 104 1.44*** 0.19 1.07, 1.80 < 10-6 1.25*** .0001 Underdog 56 0.19 0.24 -0.28, 0.65 0.43 
Fav./High 60 1.82*** 0.26 1.29, 2.31 < 10-6 0.89* .018 Fav./Low 44 0.92*** 0.24 0.45, 1.39 .0001 
Fav./Comp. 37 2.10*** 0.29 1.50, 2.64 < 10-6 1.02** .008 Fav./Chain 67 1.07*** 0.23 0.63, 1.52 < 10-6 
Und./High 22 0.27 0.53 -0.77, 1.29 0.60 0.14 .78 Und./Low 34 0.14 0.19 -0.25, 0.51 0.49 
Und./Comp. 31 0.14 0.32 -0.49, 0.75 0.66 -0.11 0.81 Und./Chain 25 0.25 0.36 -0.45, 0.95 0.48 
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
 
Table S4: Nonparametric testing of experimental data. n is the number of groups in
each condition; δ¯ is mean group shift taken over the n groups; SE, CI, and p(δ¯) are
its standard error, 95% confidence interval, and p-value; ∆δ¯ is the difference between
the δ¯ values of the comparison pair and p(∆δ¯) is its p-value. Statistical quantities
are calculated using bootstrapping with one million resamples. For testing ∆δ¯, the
comparison pair samples were pooled.
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